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Distributed ledger technologies for securities 
settlement – the case for running T2S on DLT
Alfred Taudes, Jakob Hackel, Wolfgang Haunold, Hannes Hermanky1,2  
Refereed by: Fabian Schär, University of Basel 
With a view to developing the Eurosystem’s TARGET2-Securities (T2S) system further, we propose 
a system based on distributed ledger technology (DLT) that covers all major T2S settlement 
functionalities and investigate it with regard to regulatory compliance, performance, cost effi-
ciency and risk. The system we propose is a federated system comprising European central 
banks and central securities depositories (CSDs) as node operators. The role of the central 
banks is to maintain the cash accounts; provide regulatory-approved “smart contract factories” 
defining workflows for securities issuance, lifecycle management and matching, settlement, 
auto-collateralization and corporate actions; and perform the oversight function. The CSDs 
maintain securities accounts, offer notary services for issuers, perform corporate actions, and 
carry out settlement. CSD nodes collect settlement requests from external trading and clearing 
systems, forward them to other CSDs for cross-border settlement, bundle them into transaction 
blocks and prepare the blocks for settlement. The ensuing ledger updates occur via a fully 
automated consensus process between the central banks. In T2S on DLT, specialized smart 
contracts provide the flexibility to settle a range of digitally represented assets, define novel 
workflows – and allow for variable settlement times. Rather than having to conform to a uni-
form settlement time of T+2, participants can choose among smart contracts that settle within 
seconds or longer periods of time. This feature is expected to reduce capital costs and, given 
the DLT-based enforcement of settlement discipline, settlement failures. Apart from conform-
ing to the current regulatory requirements, the DLT framework also enables the central banks 
and authorized actors to conduct status checks at a granular level and in real time. Further-
more, comparisons with similar use cases and benchmarks show that the use of current DLT 
solutions would allow to meet the current daily performance goals of T2S. Preliminary cost 
 estimates based on available public information indicate that the proposed system could be 
built and operated efficiently. The federated structure would also support the resilience of 
operations given the high number of backup nodes.
JEL classification: E44, G21, G23, K22
Keywords:  distributed ledger technology, securities settlement, smart contracts, TARGET2- 
Securities
1 Introduction
In securities transactions, ownership transfer is typically a three-stage process: 
first, a deal is established via brokers using a trading engine. Second, transactions 
are cleared through a central counterparty (CCP) to limit counterparty risk and 
provide netting benefits. Third, the deal is settled by central securities depositories 
1 Vienna University of Economics and Business, Research Institute for Cryptoeconomics, alfred.taudes@wu.ac.at 
and jakob.hackel@wu.ac.at; Oesterreichische Nationalbank, Payment Systems Strategy Office, wolfgang.haunold@oenb.at 
and hannes.hermanky@oenb.at (corresponding author). Opinions expressed by the authors of studies do not neces-
sarily reflect the official viewpoint of the OeNB or the Eurosystem. The authors would like to thank Vinzenz 
Treytl, Jamsheed Shorish and  Michael Zargham for their valuable comments on an earlier version of the work.
2 The work was supported by the Austrian Blockchain Center. ABC – Austrian Blockchain Center is funded within 
the framework of COMET – Competence Centers for Excellent Technologies by BMK, BMDW and the provinces of 
Vienna, Lower Austria and Vorarlberg. The COMET program is run by FFG.
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(CSDs) through the coordinated updating of cash and securities accounts (see 
 figure 1).
1.1 Overview of TARGET2-Securities
In Europe, securities settlement in central bank money was harmonized and cen-
tralized with TARGET2-Securities (T2S), the common platform launched by the 
Eurosystem in June 2015. Before T2S, cross-border securities settlement in Europe 
was costly and cumbersome due to different settlement practices among countries 
and complex cross-border settlement procedures. As outlined by the ECB on its 
website, “T2S lays the foundations for a single market for securities settlement and 
thus contributes to achieving greater integration of Europe’s financial market. It 
does this by:
• making it easier for investors to buy securities in other EU Member States
• reducing the cost of cross-border securities settlement
• increasing competition among providers of post-trade services (i.e. clearing and 
settlement services) in Europe
• pooling collateral and liquidity, meaning that banks no longer need to keep these 
in various locations and can quickly move them to where they are needed
• reducing settlement risk and increasing financial stability by using central bank 
money for transactions on the platform.”
Post-trade processes in the securities leg of current transactions
Figure 1
Source: Pinna and Ruttenberg, 2016.
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T2S matches settlement instructions submitted by central securities deposito-
ries and other directly connected T2S actors and coordinates the updates of the 
securities and cash legs of the transactions. T2S securities accounts are managed by 
the 21 participating CSDs while cash accounts are managed by the participating 
central banks. Of the six transaction categories handled by T2S, delivery-ver-
sus-payment (DvP, simultaneous transfer of central bank money and securities) 
accounted for 66.43% of the volume processed in 2019, followed by free-of-payment 
(FOP, delivery of securities without a simultaneous transfer of funds) with 30.60% 
of the volume (ECB, 2021a) (see figure 2). PFOD (payment free of delivery) trans-
actions, SRSE (settlement restriction on securities) transactions, LQT (liquidity 
transfer) transactions and DWP (delivery-with-payment) transactions together 
 accounted for 2.97% of the daily average volume. In addition to transactions to 
exchange securities, T2S handles corporate actions such as payments of dividends 
and administrative functions like the issuing of new securities. 
T2S settles trades in four phases within two days. From 6:45 p.m. to 8:00 p.m., 
securities are validated, and liquidity is transferred from TARGET2, the real-time 
gross settlement system operated by the Eurosystem, to dedicated cash accounts in 
T2S. Then the nighttime settlement cycle is performed from 8:00 p.m. to 3:00 p.m. 
After a two-hour maintenance window, daytime settlement starts, at the end of 
which liquidity is transferred back to TARGET2 until 6:00 p.m. The time remain-
ing to the next cycle is used for reporting.
If cash or securities necessary for settling a transaction are not available, settle-
ment fails. To enhance settlement efficiency, T2S provides credit through auto-col-
lateralization, either through “auto-collateralization on flow” (with transactions 
being secured by the securities that are being purchased) or “auto-collateralization 
on stock” (with transactions being secured by securities already held by the buyer). 
If settlement fails despite these measures, T2S retries settlement during a 60-day 
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same day was 93.27% (ECB, 2021a). Since 2020, settlement failures have been 
discouraged by financial penalties and mandatory buy-ins under CSD Regulation 
(EU) No 909/2014 (EquityClear, 2020).
T2S is owned by the Eurosystem and run by the central banks of France, Germany, 
Italy and Spain. Following initial development costs of about EUR 584 million, the 
annual running costs amount to about EUR 102 million. In 2019, T2S processed 
on average 606,938 securities transactions per day, with a value of EUR 1,106.13 
billion. On average, intra-CSD transactions, i.e. transactions within individual 
countries, represented 99.03% of all trades (ECB, 2021a). As T2S is a central plat-
form, special efforts have been made to ensure robust operation, including rotation 
between primary and secondary sites. In 2019, the availability of T2S was equal to 
or above its target of 99.7%. 
Notwithstanding major achievements of TS2, including higher security and 
lower cross-border transaction cost, the following shortcomings remain, as iden-
tified by BNP Paribas (2019):
• “The cost of settlement has not reduced. Indeed, it has increased. Even if this is 
explained by transaction volumes (lower than predicted at the launch of the project 
in 2010) and by the project’s high amortization costs, it is disappointing
• Cross-border settlements (from one CSD to another) are easier and cheaper. 
However, they still account today for less than 1% of T2S transactions and hence 
are comparatively insignificant
• We do not yet have a single European capital market – issuers have continued 
issuing in the markets that they and their investors know best
• Competition between CSDs remains limited. Its impact on pricing is unclear, as 
some CSDs have increased their asset servicing fees. Nor has competition led to 
consolidation of CSDs
• Settlement and asset servicing remain interdependent.”
1.2 Previous assessments of DLT use for securities settlement
Distributed ledger technologies (DLTs) enable the distributed storage and sharing 
of data records. At the same time, DLTs ensure data integrity through applied 
cryptography and distributed consensus-based validation protocols. Furthermore, 
they enable the execution of complex transactions via smart contracts, i.e. pro-
gramming code that executes agreements automatically on DLT computer infra-
structure. Due to their many functional features, DLTs have a potentially transfor-
mative impact on financial services. Implementation of these technologies is currently 
being considered for many financial services functions, including payments, deposits 
and loans, market provisioning, investment management, and insurance.
The potential of DLT and blockchains, a specific type of distributed ledger 
technology, for securities settlement has been studied by several authors from var-
ious perspectives.
Pinna and Ruttenberg (2016) analyze the current securities post-trade land-
scape and point out that the necessity to reconcile silos of information controlled 
by different intermediaries results in complex and expensive processes. They find 
that embracing DLT to increase the internal/cluster efficiency of existing players 
would not lead to substantial gains as long as current business practices remain 
 unchanged. In contrast, a radical transformation of trading, where issuing compa-
nies, fintechs and governments would set up a peer-to-peer system in the spirit of 
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Bitcoin, could radically reduce post-trade cost and trading time – but this approach 
is in conflict with the current regulatory environment. Therefore, Pinna and 
 Ruttenberg (2016) propose the collective adoption of DLTs by CSDs and central 
banks as a third alternative, which would yield substantial benefits within the cur-
rent regulatory environment.
Analyzing the potentials and risks of DLT for payment processing and securities 
settlement, Deutsche Bundesbank (2017) finds that DLT promises improvements 
in transparency and immutability, operational efficiency, security and resilience, 
independence from intermediaries, and automated contract processing. Yet, these 
improvements come at a cost: privacy may be at risk if current encryption technology 
becomes unsafe as technology improves, a network with different node types may 
be more prone to attacks, and links to real assets represented on a DLT have to be 
established by an intermediary. 
The Committee on Capital Markets Regulation (2019) argues that public block-
chains like Bitcoin are not suited for real-time settlement of securities transactions. 
They recommend collaborative efforts of existing stakeholders to improve current 
systems based on permissioned blockchains, pointing out the integration of the 
cash leg and reversibility of transactions as important issues. Similarly, Chiu and 
Koeppl (2019) state that, “For policymakers and regulators, three key themes 
emerge from our analysis. First, to ensure DvP, it is important to link digital ledgers 
for asset ownership and payments together to support atomic trades. Second, the 
feasibility of using a blockchain for settlement depends on a sufficient volume of 
transactions, high enough costs for tampering with the blockchain (possibly in the 
form of fines) and a limited default exposure. Here, regulation and supervision 
could play a role to ensure such conditions. Finally, in the case of a permissionless 
blockchain, coordination to adjust its design might prove difficult. Here, the regulator 
can help to coordinate the different participants to reach agreement.”
Mainelli and Milne (2016) report the outcome of a series of interviews and focus 
group meetings with professionals working in post-trade processing and the provi-
sion of mutual distributed ledger services. Respondents argued that DLTs for secu-
rities transaction processing would need to be permissioned, and that substantial 
reengineering of business processes is needed to reap the benefits of a transition to DLT.
Another factor to be taken into account is settlement time, as it determines the 
collateral and regulatory capital necessary to cope with counterparty risk. This 
would imply that the settlement time should be as short as possible. Yet, a too short 
settlement cycle may require dealers to pre-fund their trades or to borrow the se-
curities they need to settle. In 2013, for instance, the Moscow Stock Exchange 
transitioned from real-time settlement to T+2, citing security borrowing costs as 
the key rationale for this move (see Pavliva, 2013). It therefore makes sense to imple-
ment flexible settlement times, letting market participants choose this parameter. 
However, Khapko and Zoican (2020) argue that flexible settlement speed coupled 
with mandatory borrowing can lead to an inefficient race to shorter-than-optimal 
settlement cycles, excessive security borrowing activity, and economic rents for 
security lenders. They find that this tension is reduced by flexible failure-to-deliver 
penalties that depend on the cost of borrowing securities, disciplining security 
lender competition and allowing for real-time settlement. In a DLT based settlement 
system, such features can be implemented in the smart contracts that handle set-
tlement in a straightforward way (see Szabo, 1994 and 1997, for smart contracts).
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The BIS Committee on Payments and Market Infrastructures (2017) provides 
an analytical framework for analyzing the use of blockchains in payment, clearing 
and settlement. The framework consists of a method for describing the architec-
ture of a DLT network and a set of questions regarding the efficiency, safety, and 
market implications of a proposed system.
Parallel to the ongoing theoretical analysis of DLT, several prototypes of DLT 
systems for securities settlement have been built and studied, the most notable 
ones being Jasper, Stella, Ubin, Blockbaster and Helvetia (see Bech et al., 2020).
Project Jasper is a collaboration between Payments Canada, the Bank of Canada, 
TMX, Accenture and R3 (see Bank of Canada et al., 2018). In the project, DvP of 
equity tokens representing a claim on equity held in Canada’s depository system 
against cash tokens representing a claim on the Bank of Canada was tested using 
atomic settlement on the same ledger. It was found that the new process was more 
efficient and less risky when compared to the existing settlement system.
Project Stella is a collaboration between the ECB and the Bank of Japan (see 
ECB and Bank of Japan, 2018). The project tested single-ledger and cross-ledger 
DvP using security and cash tokens with a focus on settlement failures. In the single- 
ledger case, trades were found to fail when trading details had not been agreed 
between parties or when validation of the transaction failed. In such cases, the tokens 
remain with their owners, exposing traders to replacement cost risk only. In 
cross-ledger DvP, trades were found to fail if one leg of the transfer could not be 
delivered, exposing participants to principal risk, too. Hence, the ECB and the 
Bank of Japan (2018) conclude that an arbitration function on the ledger is needed 
to deal with such cases.
Based on these findings, Project Ubin (Monetary Authority of Singapore, et al., 
2018) served to build a framework for governing settlement processes, including 
arbitration processes to deal with settlement fails and a recognized market operator 
for monitoring and facilitating market functionalities. These new processes were 
found to compress the settlement cycle and to reduce principal risk.
Project Blockbaster by Deutsche Börse and Deutsche Bundesbank (see Deutsche 
Bank and Deutsche Börse, 2018) served to investigate the performance of DLT for 
securities settlement using the Hyperledger Fabric system. In these experiments, 
DLT was shown to fulfill the performance requirements necessary for building 
real-life settlement systems. Moreover, Deutsche Börse, Deutsche Bundesbank and 
Germany’s Finance Agency have recently demonstrated that it is possible to establish 
a technological bridge between blockchain technology and conventional payment 
systems to settle securities in central bank money with a transaction coordinator 
in TARGET2 (see Deutsche Bank, 2021). 
In Project Helvetia, the BIS, in cooperation with SIX Group AG and the Swiss 
National Bank, showed that it is possible to provide central bank money to settle 
securities transactions in a realistic near-live setting using new technologies (see 
BIS et al., 2020). This exercise confirmed the feasibility of linking up the existing 
systems and of issuing digital central bank money.
Shabsigh et al. (2020) summarize the findings from DLT prototype projects in 
settlement as follows: “In general, the DLT prototypes showed that DLT could be 
viable for post-trade securities processing and all projects concluded that securities 
settlement is a highly suitable and feasible environment for DLT-based solutions. The 
experiments showed that different DvP models can be implemented in DLT-based 
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systems. DLT solutions can vary considerably in features and tools, with which a 
more efficient processing and account method can be designed and customized for 
improved efficiency and security in specific markets according to market needs.”
Regarding the architectures tested, Shabsigh et al. (2020) state: “In all proto-
types, the central bank was given the role of cash instrument provider and could 
thereby also be the one ensuring DvP requirements. A project assumption appeared 
to be that securities clearing and settlement systems operate within a market structure 
close to the current structure—that is, exchanges, dealers, CCPs, CSDs, custodians, 
and central banks operate in similar or near-similar roles as they do today and in a 
multilayered registration structure. None of the projects analyzed flatter market 
structures and DvP processing at the end-investor level or other radical structural 
changes in the market and associated risks.” With regard to open issues, Shabsigh 
et al. (2020) mention the study of the impact of real-time 24/7/365 processing on 
the design of the system, the analysis of liquidity and credit risk in a realistic setting 
and the possible changes in market structures.
In addition to the experimental project discussed above, two DLT-based sys-
tems for securities settlement are at the pre-production stage, one in Australia and 
one in Switzerland. The Australian Stock Exchange has developed a DLT-based 
system for clearing, settlement, and securities registration to replace its current 
system, called CHESS (Australian Stock Exchange, 2020). The new system, which 
builds on a prototype developed in 2016, only covers the securities leg. Develop-
ment costs were reported to amount to USD 50 million.
The Swiss DLT settlement prototype, developed by SDX, covers the full secu-
rities value chain including order entry, order crossing in the matching3 engine, 
DvP settlement on Corda DLT and distributed holdings of intermediated securi-
ties/tokenized cash. The reported costs are USD 100 million so far. According to 
SDX (2019) “Test-cases will showcase the potential of SDX’s riskless trading 
model, as well as settlement on DLT. Early-stage functionality will cover digital 
security token issuance as well as live trading and instant settlement. This will include 
the cash-leg of the transaction embracing the concept of a payment token as well as 
access to a distributed portal where it would be possible to monitor transactions 
across specific DLT member nodes.” When moving to the new system, SDX expects 
costs to decrease due to reduced collateral requirements, lower operational costs, 
and lower data management costs enabling potentially lower fees per transaction. 
Further benefits anticipated are an increased asset universe, new primary and sec-
ondary markets, a private marketplace for interbank/inter-client trades, real-time 
information at the client holding level enabled by the link between asset and owner 
and a significant simplification of corporate event handling. 
1.3 Outline
Based on these findings, we present a DLT-based architecture for T2S and describe 
how T2S would work in this new environment. In the description, we concentrate 
on delivery-versus-payment (DvP) transactions and corporate actions. The princi-
ples discussed here also apply to the other transaction types. Subsequently, we 
analyze the feasibility and advantages of our design from a technical and economic 
3 Matching is the process of comparing the settlement details provided by the buyer and the seller of securities in 
 order to ensure that they agree on the settlement terms of the transaction.
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perspective and with regard to compliance with the regulatory environment/
framework based on the framework presented by the BIS Committee on Payments 
and Market Infrastructures (2017). In the conclusion section, we summarize our 
findings and outline some topics for future research.
2 Specification of T2s on DLT
2.1 Architecture – understanding the arrangement
Type of DLT: Following the findings in literature, the system we propose is not pub-
licly accessible but private and permissioned. It employs a heavily centralized con-
sensus protocol, based on a predefined (closed) set of consensus-relevant nodes, 
and restricts read access. Unlike with public DLT solutions like Bitcoin or Ethereum, 
this provides advantages from a regulatory perspective, as public DLT solutions are 
incompatible with existing case law (Pinna and Ruttenberg, 2016). Moreover, per-
missioned DLTs have a higher capacity and fewer restraints than current permis-
sionless blockchains. Public blockchains currently have trade-offs in lower throughput 
to preserve as much decentralization as possible (see Schäffer et al., 2019). Since 
permissonless networks are incompatible with current regulation regarding EU-
wide securities settlement, our system makes a tradeoff in decentralization to 
achieve higher throughput than decentralized public solutions. Such a tradeoff neces-
sarily comes with the caveat of loosened immutability, since permissioned networks 
are by design controlled by the parties that are authorized to establish consensus 
on the state of the network. Additionally, the permissioned model does not allow 
regular users to verify transactions or the current state themselves, which is a core 
premise of the permissionless model as used in some public blockchains. 
Some of these conditions might change in the future. Regulation might adapt 
and become more welcoming to decentralized consensus on a European settlement 
layer, accepting some level of power over the infrastructure by unknown partici-
pants while preserving regulatory oversight and final say over settlement on a set-
tlement layer connected to a permissionless blockchain implementation. Moreover, 
public and decentralized DLTs are steadily improving their base layers, as well as 
introducing various solutions of off-chain scaling possibilities, such as Layer 2 imple-
mentations. Such Layer 2 implementations allow for a fully secure, slower settle-
ment layer while more scalable implementations handle most of the network load. 
Notably the Lightning Network is an ongoing attempt to outsource load from the 
Bitcoin network onto a Layer 2 solution, which handles transactions through a net-
work of bidirectional payment channels (Poon and Dryja, 2016). Most implemen-
tations attempt to solve scalability issues by conducting off-chain transactions and 
only committing limited data as proof to the settlement layer. Some of these imple-
mentations use rollups, mainly ZK rollups (which commit bundled transactions 
through more complex “zero-knowledge proof” technology) and optimistic rollups 
(which leverage users actively monitoring and reporting on invalidly committed 
proofs) (see Whitehat, 2018, for ZK rollups and Optimism for an implementation 
of optimistic rollups). Additionally, “decentralized finance” (DeFi) tools might 
bring forward newer technological innovations, which might allow for a preservation 
of decentralization with high throughput. DeFi acts under different constraints and 
is described in detail by Schär (2021). 
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Nodes: The DLT design proposed comprises two types of nodes: 
• Central bank nodes: These nodes are authority nodes and designed to manage 
the infrastructure and develop it further. They have supervisory duties and are 
responsible for maintaining cash accounts, regulating access to the cash leg and 
the trading engine, and updating the ledger of transactions.
• Central securities depository nodes: These nodes are settlement nodes and 
 responsible for maintaining securities accounts, issuing new securities, performing 
settlement, and handling corporate actions. CSD nodes have selected read access 
to the ledger.
Users: Users send settlement instructions to be relayed by CSDs and receive reports 
about their holdings and transactions. They do not have access to the ledger but 
interact with the system via a dashboard which enables them to access messages, 
send message requests, and select transaction possibilities and currently available 
methods for settlement. Users, such as commercial banks, can sign their transactions 
with a key pair. However, direct access to the ledger, which would allow for inde-
pendent verification by users, would necessitate either a much higher transparency 
of other users’ actions or highly complex cryptographic methods, which would 
introduce drawbacks and complexities of their own. In our system, the group of 
users is still restricted to holders of central bank accounts. 
Accounts: We distinguish between user-controlled accounts and smart contract 
accounts, much like permissionless blockchains such as Ethereum (see Buterin, 
2014). Members of central banks, CSDs and user organizations interact with the 
system via user-controlled accounts, with the control tools being keys for the autho-
rization of transactions with one or multiple signatures, depending on local gover-
nance rules. Smart contract accounts contain computer code that sends transactions 
which constitute ledger updates if included in a block, based on function invoca-
tions (see Szabo, 1994 and 1997). For T2S on DLT, we propose smart contracts to 
ensure that buying and selling instructions are executed (settlement smart contracts), 
to represent securities holdings and execute corporate actions (securities smart 
contracts), and to enable auto-collateralization. 
Smart contract factories: Smart contract factories enable central banks to offer a 
dynamic collection of regulatory-compliant building blocks for settlement pro-
cesses rather than default smart contracts limited to a single type of settlement and 
security. Smart contract factories serve to generate a range of smart contracts 
based on predefined standards, a feature already used on public blockchains such as 
Ethereum by projects such as Uniswap and Authereum. Thus, CSDs can create 
specific smart contracts to enable transactions with certain assets (e.g. stocks) to 
be settled in a certain way (e.g. DvP) with certain workflow specifications (e.g. 
T+1) subject to the prevailing technical and regulatory requirements. In other 
words, while being responsible for the execution of transactions, CSDs are con-
strained by the types of assets and workflows available from the smart contract 
factories managed by the central banks. Allowing for contracts to be made fully 
flexible without mandatory smart contract factory control might imply too drastic 
a departure from the way T2S operates today. 
Basic settlement process: Figure 3 provides an overview of the proposed system’s 
consensus and describes the path for a transaction to be included in an update of 
the ledger’s state, by inclusion in a block. 
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Transactions are broadcasted from one CSD to the next, with each CSD storing 
transactions to be processed in a pool until they are settled with finality through 
inclusion in a block, i.e. a permanent record of transactions, by him or another 
CSD. Whenever a CSD is chosen by the proof-of-authority (POA) selection mech-
anism to be next in line for block proposition, he selects transactions outstanding 
from the pool and then proposes his block to the central banks by broadcasting it. 
The central banks check the block formally for requirements and sign off if the 
block was formed validly, or refuse their signature if it was formed invalidly. If a 
block is not accepted, the proposal mechanism chooses another CSD and starts the 
process again. Blocks that are signed off as valid are stored as an update to the ledger 
by all parties, who also delete the now-included transactions from their pool, and 
the process starts again. 
In this setting, national banks cannot suggest that a particular transaction be 
settled. Nor can they reject a transaction for arbitrary reasons, which would be 
obvious to everyone else. All of this happens within seconds. Unlike in permission-
less systems, which currently establish consensus mostly based on proof-of-work 
(POW, see Nakamoto 2008), in a POA consensus mechanism all participants are 
known and identifiable. This restricts the participation in settlement to CSDs and 
central banks, as current regulation demands. As a necessary drawback, the system 
is highly centralized when compared to open and permissionless blockchains. Most 
notably, the framework enables CSDs to censor transactions by not relaying them 
further or by not including them into the blocks they form. This issue is somewhat 
mitigated by users being able to send their transactions to a different CSD as well 
as central bank oversight. Additionally, as central banks have final authority over 
the infrastructure they can roll back transactions to restore a previous state, either 
if reconciliation is impossible otherwise or if enough central banks were to collude 
(“malicious nodes”). For a more formal description of POA and its benefits and 
limitations see De Angelis et al. (2018).
Consensus mechanism
Figure 3
Source: OeNB/Vienna University of Economics and Business.
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Cash leg: Each central bank has the right to initiate new cash generation against 
collateral to provide liquidity to the system. When the DLT system is launched, 
each participating central bank defines their initial cash balance. This balance is 
prefunded and serves initial funding requirements. To top up this balance, each 
central bank can initiate self-funding transactions to be included in the next block; 
much like Bitcoin blocks include “Coinbase” transactions, which allow for the cre-
ation of new Bitcoins. Together, all central banks also operate a multi-signatory 
account, requiring signatures from all parties, to collect cash that is to be removed 
from the system. Once sent to said address, the respective funds are locked for 
anyone and can only be unlocked through a unanimous decision of all central 
banks. These two mechanisms allow for the creation and destruction of cash in the 
system. Together, they allow for a flexible cash regime where clients in TARGET2 
can deposit cash with their central bank, which in turn creates that amount of cash 
via a self-funding transaction on the DLT ledger and then sends this cash to the 
client’s cash account on the DLT ledger. Until TARGET2 has been consolidated 
with TARGET2-Securities, which removes the requirement to net out end-of-day 
balances, this DLT process can also be used to create and remove daily balances. 
When the multi-signatory address has a large enough balance, central banks can 
use this already existing but locked cash to fund cash accounts again or use it for 
auto-collateralization by unanimous decision and signature.
Overview of roles and obligations: Figure 4 summarizes the roles and obligations 
in the system. Central banks act as validators and are obliged to propagate blocks. 
They also mint/burn cash and are able to lock funds. The central banks coopera-
tively create smart contract factories, keep the infrastructure up to date by building 
and updating the protocols, handle permissions of CSDs and approve blocks. The 
CSDs can create new contracts using the smart contract factories provided by the 
central banks, and handle transactions and corporate actions. Moreover, it is their 




Source: OeNB/Vienna University of Economics and Business.
Distributed ledger technologies for securities settlement –  
the case for running T2S on DLT
24  OESTERREICHISCHE NATIONALBANK
2.2 Security smart contracts
Creation: Similar to regular token con-
tracts on permissionless DLTs, such as 
ERC20 (Vogelsteller and Buterin, 
2015), which contain standardized 
functions that, for instance, allow any-
one in the system to check the balance 
of any user, a T2S DLT  security smart 
contract is created by a CSD and con-
tains standardized functions. It con-
sists of building blocks provided by the 
smart contract factories, which define 
the possible data structure and entries 
available to the CSD. This mechanism 
ensures that newly created securities 
comply with the relevant regulatory 
requirements. Factories are used to 
provide largely harmonized constructs 
for corporate actions and settlement 
processes, too. The ability of smart 
contracts to interact with each other 
allows for transparent automated pro-
cesses. Similar security contracts have been proposed for standardization in per-
missionless blockchains such as Ethereum via EIP/ERC-1400 (Dossa, 2018).
Structure: As can be seen from figure 5, a security smart contract has an address 
through which it can be called, and through which it can receive/send euro amounts 
and the contract’s security token. Moreover, it stores the ISIN as a link to the CSD 
database. A security smart contract is owned by the CSD that records the security, 
and this CSD is the only party that can invalidate the contract by issuing a new one 
with a copied state (to allow for upgrades). Issuer information is provided either 
with in-system addresses or stored outside of the system. Ownership is tracked 
with a dictionary recording the current owners of the respective tokens. These 
variables are updated by settlement smart contracts (see below). Another variable 
indicates whether the security is available for auto-collateralization. This variable 
is set by the central bank controlling the auto-collateralization whitelist contract. 
Further, the contract can lock and unlock holdings when “called” by either central 
banks or through auto-collateralization contracts (see below). This prevents owners 
from sending their balance while the security is locked by auto-collateralization. 
Finally, contract functions are designed to execute corporate actions. For instance, 
a dividend function can be called with a certain timestamp/blockstamp set to 
 dividend payout days with a view to distributing the current euro balance to the 
owners according to current holding structures.
2.3 Settlement smart contracts
Settlement smart contracts serve to trigger exchanges according to defined rules. 
Contracts are created by the CSD through the smart contract factories to ensure 
that both instructions of a deal are posted to the ledger or none. In the system we 
propose, both securities and cash exist on the same ledger, so smart contracts can 
Security smart contract
Figure 5
Source: OeNB/Vienna University of Economics and Business.
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be used for atomic settlement. As can 
be seen from figure 6, an atomic set-
tlement smart contract has an address 
through which it can be called, and 
through which it can receive/send 
euro amounts and security tokens. 
The contract is owned by the CSD 
that initially created the settlement 
contract. This CSD can also invalidate 
the contract by issuing a new one (to 
allow for upgrades). 
Such atomic transactions are imple-
mented in permissionless blockchains 
as swap contracts or decentralized 
 exchanges (see AirSwap or Schär, 2021). 
The standard contracts serve to trig-
ger two transactions that need to be 
carried out:
• The first transaction is an initial 
calling of the contract, which includes 
the sender’s instructions and signa-
ture. The instructions include a 
euro sender address and amount, a securities sender address and an amount and 
an exit transaction timestamp, which allows terminating the settlement unless 
both sides have sent their part by a defined time/blockstamp. A blockstamp 
specifies the settlement time in terms of the number of blocks that have been 
posted to the ledger following the creation or calling of the smart contract.
• The second transaction, in which the contract receives either euro amounts or 
security tokens, triggers the contract. The transaction necessitates a signature 
and a set of instructions that fits the one it references and which was received 
earlier. If the set of instructions or the amount sent do not fit the initial transac-
tion received, the funds are returned to the sender. 
• The contract’s transactions are triggered if either the corresponding euro 
amounts or security tokens are sent, or the timestamp expires. When the cor-
rect amount of both settlement parties is received according to instructions sent 
and signed by both parties the contract fulfills the instructions by sending the 
respective euro amounts and security tokens to the respective receiver, thus set-
tling DvP in the agreed-upon timeframe. If the correct amounts of both parties 
are not received by the timestamp recorded in the initial set of instructions, the 
contract invalidates the initial instructions and returns any funds sent earlier and 
according to instructions back to the respective sender. In such a case, the con-
tract sends a settlement fail message to the central banks, which allows them to 
penalize the actor that failed to deliver.
Settlement smart contract
Figure 6
Source: OeNB/Vienna University of Economics and Business.
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Figure 7 shows how the security and settlement smart contracts interact with the 
transaction processing mechanism for the example of a security delivered against 
cash. The two signed transactions trigger an exchange via the settlement contract 
if, and only if both parties send their side in full and in time. If either of those con-
ditions is not met, the settlement contract returns any received assets back to the 
respective owner.  
2.4 Smart contracts for auto-collateralization
Another two types of smart contracts serve to accomplish credit provision through 
auto-collateralization via “auto-collateralization on flow” or “auto-collateralization 
on stock”: auto-collateralization and the auto-collateralization list (see figure 8). 
Auto-collateralization locks securities which are already in the possession of the 
buyer or after they have been transferred and reverses the lock when the credit 
provided by the central banks via the respective smart contract has been repaid. 
Auto-collateralization is owned by the central banks via multi-signature control, 
meaning that changes must be signed by several central banks. This contract is pre-
funded by central banks and recovers its balance as needed to unlock funds previ-
ously used in auto-collateralization. To achieve auto-collateralization, the respective 
smart contracts check several aspects, including:
• the authorization of the address calling the contract to receive auto-collateralization
• the current balances (euro and tokens)
• the auto-collateralization list smart contract, to see if the requested security 
 token is currently whitelisted to be used for auto-collateralization
• the instructions sent to the auto-collateralization smart contract
Settlement mechanism
Figure 7
Source: OeNB/Vienna University of Economics and Business.
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The contract then sends euro balances to cover the transaction and locks tokens in 
the respective security smart contract (see figure 9). In case of auto-collateralization 
on stock, the tokens locked are already in the requesting user’s control and will be 
locked in the respective token contract. In case of auto-collateralization on flow, 
the respective share of the newly acquired security tokens is locked after the own-
ership change in the token contract. The smart contract can also be called to  reverse 
the locks when the credit is repaid, where it again checks rights and  instructions, 
and needs to receive the proper amount of euro to unlock the contracted tokens. 
The auto-collateralization list defines smart contract functions as a whitelist for 
auto-collateralization. It is owned by the central banks via multi-signature control 
and has a function that administers a dictionary containing the addresses of secu-




Source: OeNB/Vienna University of Economics and Business.
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3 Evaluation of the design
3.1 Architecture and governance
The system we propose better represents the federated structure of the Eurosys-
tem than the current T2S architecture as every national bank has the same access 
in its capacity as an authority node – i.e. has access to data, voting rights and autho-
rization possibilities. This means that the infrastructure and database are managed 
jointly on an equal footing. All participating central banks are thus granted the 
same rights. The central securities depositories are responsible for DvP and for the 
settlement of securities accounts. An effective separation of powers is achieved 
through role allocation and task assignment in the system. With regard to implica-
tions for the financial market architecture, the proposed system is evolutionary in 
the sense that it does not change the role of existing actors and procedures besides 
making securities settlement more efficient and effective. It is also innovative as it 
facilitates the integration of other assets in the settlement and  allows for flexible 
settlement times. Moreover, new types of settlement workflows can be integrated 
in an incremental fashion via the smart contract factories.
3.2 Regulatory compliance
The architecture we propose provides advantages over the current system in the 
area of supervision possibilities. Banks, in the system as users, and their clients (not 
in the system) can be represented and controlled on the platform at a granular level 
and in real time. Auditing and supervision are possible in real time with granular 
data up to a direct holding level. With every status update of the system, the central 
banks have immediate access to information about the current state of the system, 
capital holdings, etc. Furthermore, automated reports are possible: At certain 
Auto-collateralization mechanism
Figure 9
Source: OeNB/Vienna University of Economics and Business.
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points in time or for certain events, reports are automatically generated – for  example, 
on settlement failures – and automatically sent to the relevant stakeholders, perhaps 
even requiring a signature to confirm receipt. In this system, we can also program 
compliance checks to a certain extent. This means, for example, that one can pro-
gram assets so that they can only be held by predefined (list) addresses or persons. 
This list can be updated at hourly, daily, or weekly intervals. This function is similar 
to the auto-collateralization process where users and/or assets are checked against 
an associated whitelist. 
At the regulatory level, there are two identified hurdles, each of which can be 
solved by two options. First, paper certificates are regulated at the national level. 
Central securities depositories can continue to store documents first and then rep-
resent them digitally in the proposed concept. Alternatively, regulatory changes 
would have to be implemented for a purely digital securities certificate, as is cur-
rently being considered in Germany. Second, certain functions of central securities 
depositories are regulated EU-wide. In our case, this concerns, for example, the 
management of securities accounts and the execution of settlement. Current pro-
cesses can also be replicated in this case. In the proposed concept, CSDs bundle 
the transactions to be carried out and propose them as a block, which would then 
be jointly signed off by the central banks, as required by regulatory standards. 
3.3 Performance
Capacity: T2S currently settles 600,000 transactions per day on average. Settlement 
must also be possible within at least one day, and cash transactions (when the cash 
leg is included) must be completed in less than ten minutes. 
These figures are feasible in the DLT system we propose. As a comparison, 
even the limited permissionless Ethereum blockchain can process 700,000 trans-
actions per day on average. Performance tests of federated platforms are a more 
realistic comparison. Other platforms that make a tradeoff in decentralization are 
achieving much higher throughput than current public and permissionless plat-
forms. Corda can handle more than 50 million transactions per day, with tests 
showing much higher, Quorum can handle over 60 million and Hyperledger Fabric 
can support at least 13 million, up to over 100 million in tests (see Creer, 2018, for 
Corda; Baliga et al., 2018, for Quorum; and Parth et al., 2018, or Chung et al., 2019, 
for Hyperledger Fabric). These results show that there is enough capacity also in 
peak times even in a net-settlement system and under the assumption of further 
restrictions (higher number of transactions per settlement with an external cash leg).
Speed: Meeting time restrictions is no problem from a technical point of view, 
either. Based on comparisons of existing platforms and the analysis of the technical 
tests mentioned, the concept assumes possible final DvP settlements under one 
minute, cash transactions under 30 seconds (see e.g. Baliga et al., 2018; Chung et al., 
2019; Thakkar et al., 2018; and Creer, 2018). The proposed concept enables par-
ticipants to use variable settlement times. This would make it possible to settle 
most transactions within seconds. In order to offer alternative processes, e.g. short 
sales, it is possible to integrate selected settlement periods (e.g. DvP+1) as well. 
3.4 Cost efficiency
Development and operational costs: In terms of costs, there are very few compa-
rable projects. For example, the Swiss project of the SIX Group is worth about 
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USD 100 million, including the first prototype and progress implementation (see 
SDX, 2019). The Australian Stock Exchange ASX project is valued at over USD 50 
million with roughly comparable progress (see Australian Stock Exchange, 2020). 
Otherwise, there are hardly any comparisons for federated DLT projects. Ernst & 
Young (2019) estimates USD 1.5 million for a simple prototype. This does not take 
into account the costs of overcoming the regulatory hurdles – which are also a major 
cost factor when implementing the system we propose.
Based on these media reports on comparable projects, it can be estimated that 
a comprehensive settlement solution based on DLT would be implemented at much 
lower cost than the amount spent for T2S. Due to savings through lower complexity 
in monitoring as well as increased flexibility of the participants, lower costs than 
the current amount spent for T2S can be expected during operation. 
Competition between CSDs can be stimulated by employing a market mechanism 
to determine the settlement fees. Similar to Bitcoin transaction fees, a maximum 
willingness to pay can be included in a settlement instruction, which will be col-
lected by the CSD that includes the instruction in the block proposed to the central 
banks.
Cost of credit and liquidity management: A key benefit of the proposed architecture 
is the possibility of flexible settlement times. Here, the parties of a transaction can 
choose a settlement time depending on the conditions of the deal within the regu-
latory boundaries specified in the settlement smart contract factory. Our design is 
flexible enough to allow for the implementation of more complex schemes like the 
flexible failure to deliver penalties proposed in Khapko and Zoican (2020). This 
should provide for a substantial reduction of the cost of capital; the amount of savings 
could be determined via a market survey (e.g. Boston Consulting Group, 2012) 
and through prototyping.
Efficiency gains from automated contract tools: Corporate actions can be automated 
via security smart contracts. Similarly, all aspects of a settlement transaction includ-
ing penalties, reporting etc. can be automated with settlement security contracts. 
Thus, operational costs may shrink substantially.
Users, such as banks, can control various addresses depending on their specific 
needs. Users, while not able to see the full ledger themselves, are able to request 
automatic reports on their holdings and history. Such reports are trivial to imple-
ment, as they can be easily generated from a full access ledger view (full history of 
the ledger); and authentication for a user account is given via signature. 
Speed and transparency in reconciliation: As shown in figure 3, the system auto-
matically keeps the ledger and the local databases of the CSDs in sync. Therefore, no 
additional reconciliation steps are necessary, which avoids costs and time for rec-
onciliation. Due to the automatic reports, reconciliation with the users is  improved too.
3.5 Operations and security risk
In general, the system we propose is highly resilient due to its federated structure, 
where nodes can be in every participating country instead of four operating sites in 
two regions. This can allow for resilience against attacks and prevent downtimes. 
In attacks attempting to remove certain actors from the system by blocking their 
infrastructure, the remainder of participating members will keep the system run-
ning and active. This allows for continued operations even when several nodes are 
attacked at the same time. 
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Introducing fraudulent transactions into the system would require control over 
the private key of the sender’s address and could be rolled back later by CSDs and 
central banks. Cash leaving the system is controlled by central banks initiating the 
transfers to TARGET2. Additionally, since all members participating in consensus 
are known, verified, and bound by regulatory requirements, the potential damage 
by bad actors is limited. Since full control over the infrastructure lies with the central 
banks, the system can be halted or stopped if needed. 
At the same time, the code of the smart contract factories needs to be thor-
oughly checked and verified, and key management at the central banks and CSDs 
must be organized properly to prevent security breaks and attacks. Implementing 
proper management of cryptographic access to the system and its components will 
be necessary to limit potential attack vectors. This process does not differ signifi-
cantly from other financial infrastructures. Yet, DLT systems are still emerging 
technologies that continue to be under development and need proper verification 
of all code, especially the logic determining the smart contract factories. Proper 
infrastructure upgrade processes need to be established early in order to deter-
mine a collaborative but secure infrastructure maintenance by the central banks. 
To achieve high quality levels and transparency, the system should be open source. 
Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation (2020) provides a comprehensive secu-
rity framework for DLT applications in the financial industry that offers measures 
to minimize operational and security risk.
4 Conclusions and outlook
We have shown how the core functionality of the T2S system for securities settle-
ment in Europe could be realized on the basis of DLT. We propose an architecture 
where the participating central banks provide the infrastructure and regulatory 
oversight on an equal footing in a federated way, replicating the ledger and provid-
ing the digital infrastructure via smart contract factories and signing off settlement 
transactions. Within this framework, the CSDs perform settlement. The cash leg 
may either be integrated but payment may also be effected via a separate payment 
system. The main advantages of the system are shorter and variable settlement 
times, increased regulatory compliance, reduced reporting, and reconciliation 
overhead and flexibility with regard to asset types and settlement procedures. 
These features may be considered sufficiently attractive to detail the proposal 
further in the direction of a prototype that allows the assumptions to be tested in 
a realistic setting. Such a system would be an ideal basis for studying the impact of 
real-time 24/7/365 processing on the system design, for analyzing liquidity and 
credit risk in a realistic setting and for further investigating the possible changes in 
market structures.
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